Perilaku Ekonomi Aktor Politik dalam Proses Voting

Abstract

The foundation of a democratic government is that it respects the will of the people as expressed through the ballot box. Unfortunetely, these lofty ideals are not so easily implemented. Strategic interactions arise in voting, just as in other multi person game. Neither majority rule nor any other voting scheme can solve these problem, for there does not exist anyone perfect system for aggregating up individuals' preferences into a will of the people. This deep result is due to Kenneth J. Arrow. His theorem demonstrates logically that any system for aggregating unrestricted preferences over three or more alternatives into a group decision cannot simultaneously satisfy the following minimally properties: (1) Collective Rationality, (2) Unrestricted Domain, (3) Pareto Principle, (4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and (5) Non-dictatorship.

This study is about strategic voting. How should people behave In voting process? My answer does not deal with ethics or etiquette. Nor do I aim to compete with philosophers or preachers. My theme, although less lofty, affects the lives of all of us just as much as do morality and manners. All of us may be strategiests, whether we like it or not.