Prisoner’s Dilemma Game dalam Perdagangan Internasional: Teori dan Bukti Empiris

Abstract

This paper aims to provide an appraisal of game theory in the field of international economics, and demonstrates that strategic interactions between two or more countries are not less Important to elaborate, in order to capture behavioral aspects of international trade. By applying the Cournot model of oligopoly and endogenlzing government behavior in the model, it is shown that competing countries are subject to a prisoner's dilemma game, under which they keep mutually harmful actions. The prisoner's dilemma situation arises when two or more parties are motivated to behave in a self-serving manner, take a tougher stand, and they assume that their rivals witi act similarly.

My own research results a situation resembling the prisoner's dilemma phenomena in which Indonesia and Japan are not able to reach the payoff that is compelling for psychological reason. If there is a tommorow, dramatic consequences may arise. At worst, the international relations between them could be constantly threatened by a series of tension, or, if tension escalates, serious conflict may occur.

This problem is primarily one of transaction costs: the costs of getting the concerned parties together, of reaching agreement and credible commitment, and enforcing the terms of that agreement, If there were no costs involved in carrying out the agreement, the system would lead to a natural arrangement of who is to facilitate and enforce the agreement, to compensate, to monitor, and so on.