Struktur Pasar Oligopoli dan Peran Informasi: Sebuah Studi Eksperimental

Abstract

Market structures that capture the strategic interaction between the actors is an oligopoly market. When making decisions, each oligopolistic and even consider trying to guess what decision has been/will be run by its rival. During consideration, conjecture, an oligopoly action influence the expectation of the opponent, the activities that constitute the strategic behavior. Noon-cooperative games is likely to make the oligopolist ‘trapped’ in a prisoner’s dilemma situation especially if the interaction of the time (one-shot). Information not play at all, because the interaction takes place one time (one-shot) then the ‘game’ ends. How is the role of information Cournot and Bertrand took place repeatedly? Under conditions of complete information, is there any process to the prisoner’s dilemma?This study conducted experiments to 8 players who act as competing companies. Experiments conducted on Cournot model and Bertrand models. The experimental results show that the availability of information about the opponent’s action in experimental Cournot and Bertrand market, making the market more competitive. In other words, make the information trapped in the competitive marketplace that benefits consumers on the one hand, but on the other hand bring producers into the prisoner’s dilemma situation.